We study a class of noncooperative networks where N users send tra c to a destination node over two links with given capacities in such a way that a Nash equilibrium is achieved. Under a linear cost structure for the individual users, we obtain several dynamic policy adjustment schemes for the on-line computation of the Nash equilibrium, and study their local convergence properties. These policy adjustment schemes require minimum information on the part of each user regarding the cost/utility functions of the others.
INTRODUCTION
We consider a routing problem in networks, in which two parallel links are shared between a number of players. In the context of telecommunication networks, the players could stand for users, who have to decide on what fraction of their tra c to send on each link of the network.
A natural framework within which to analyze this class of problems is that of noncooperative game theory, and an appropriate solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium 2]: a routing policy for the users constitutes a Nash equilibrium if no user can gain by unilaterally deviating from his own policy.
There exists rich literature on the analysis of equilibria in networks, particularly for the case of the in nitesimal user; see, e.g., 6, 10] in the context of road tra c. More recently, the issue of competitive routing has been studied, where the network 1 Research supported by a Grant from the France-Israel Scienti c Cooperation (in Computer Science and Engineering) between the French Ministry of Research and Technology and the Israeli Ministry of Science and Technology, on information highways. 2 Research supported in part by Grants NSF INT 98-04950, NSF ANI 98-13710, and an ARO/EPRI MURI Grant. 1 is shared by several users with each one having a non-negligible amount of ow. Our starting point here is the work reported in 10, 18, 15, 14, 16] on competitive routing, which has presented the basic optimality concept in routing within a noncooperative framework, and using the Nash equilibrium solution concept. In these cited papers, conditions have been obtained for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. This has enabled, in particular, the design of network management policies that induce e cient equilibria 15] .
Nash equilibrium has an obvious operational meaning if all users employ from the beginning their equilibrium policies; in that case it is self-enforcing and is optimal, in the sense that no user has any incentive to deviate from it. The main di culty with this notion of equilibrium from a practical point of view, however, is that in realistic situations there is no justi cation for the assumption that the system is initially in equilibrium, nor for the one that there is coordination among the users in reaching an equilibrium. Moreover, the users are generally unable to compute the equilibrium individually, since it is a function of the unknown utilities and other parameters private to each player. Instead, a natural assumption on the behavior of users is that they are likely to behave in a greedy way: each user would update occasionally its own decisions so as to optimize its individual performance, without any coordination with other users. Accordingly, a central objective of this paper is to analyze di erent types of greedy behavior on the part of the users, and to relate these to the Nash equilibrium.
The need for decentralized distributed individual controls in telecommunication networks has stimulated a substantial amount of research using game theoretic methods, in both routing and ow control 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21] . Within the design of ow control, decentralized and distributed greedy protocols have been analyzed. The study of decentralized greedy routing, however, is new, and heretofore only the special case of two links and two players has been studied 18].
In the next section we introduce the model adopted in the paper for the general M link case, and establish the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. In Section 3,
we obtain an explicit expression for the equilibrium under a linear cost on rate of ow for M parallel links. In Section 4 we develop and study stability of various update algorithms, for the case of two links. The concluding remarks of the last section end the paper.
THE MODEL
Consider M parallel links between two points source and destination. There are N users who have to send tra c from the source to the destination. User i requires a total rate of transmission i , and := P N i=1 i is the total tra c rate sent by all users. The users have to decide on how to distribute their tra c over the M links.
Each link may correspond to a processor, in a context of parallel processors and distributed computing 13]. The tra c then corresponds to a ow of jobs.
We formulate this problem as a noncooperative network, i.e., a network in which the rate at which tra c is sent is determined by sel sh users, each having its own utility (or cost). Let As in 15, 18] , we assume that the cost per unit of tra c of player i sent over link m is a function of m , which we denote by f m ( m ). This cost typically represents the expected delay, or a function of the expected delay over the link. Thus, the overall The optimality concept we adopt is that of Nash equilibrium, i.e., we seek a fea- where the minimum is taken over all policies~ i that lead to a feasible multi-policy.
We recall the following result from 18] for the unconstrained case. of an M/M/1 queue (i.e., an in nite bu er queue in which arrivals occur according to a Poisson process with rate m , service times have independent exponential distribution with parameter 1=C m , and arrivals and service times are mutually independent). For this special structure, it is possible to compute explicitly the corresponding Nash equilibrium solution.
In this paper we specialize to the following particular (but di erent) cost function, which will also allow us to compute and characterize the Nash equilibrium: f m ( m ) = a m m : (2) In the context of telecommunication systems, this cost would represent the expected waiting time of a packet in a light tra c regime. where (1) m and (2) m are, respectively, the rst and second moments of the service time in the queue. The parameter C m introduced earlier can then be identi ed with 1= (1) m , since the number of packets that the server can handle per unit time is on the average 1= (1) m . Now, under the light tra c regime, i.e., with m << C m , the above expression for EW m can be approximated by a m m , where a m = (2) m . A special application for this model arises in road tra c. The setting is appropriate if a user is viewed as a company that ships goods using many vehicles. The company then has to decide what fraction of its tra c to route on each link.
COMPUTATION OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we obtain an explicit expression for the Nash equilibrium when f m is given by (2) , and further show that the equilibrium is unique. The main result is given in the following theorem. 
In the computation of the Nash equilibrium, we rst ignore the positivity constraints (R1), by assuming the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution with strictly positive ows, and then show that such a solution indeed exists. From the uniqueness result of 18], it then follows that this is indeed the unique equilibrium point.
With the positivity constraint thus ignored, the best response of user i can be obtained by computing the partial derivative of J i with respect to i l , l = 1; :::; M?1, and setting it equal to zero. (Indeed, the best response of player i corresponds to the minimum cost for that player for given strategies of the other players. Since the cost is convex, this minimum is indeed obtained at the value of f i l g l for which 
The best response f i l g l for player i, for xed strategies f j l g l;j , j 6 = i, is thus obtained by solving
This yields the following expression for the minimizing rate i l , l = 
Since l = l is a necessary condition for f i l g l;i to be in equilibrium, we obtain by taking the sum, We thus arrive at the following necessary condition:
and solving for l , we have: l = (a M =a l ) M ; or equivalently, l = k=a l ; for some constant k. This constant can be obtained from the rate constraint, i.e., 
Remark. We observe from the theorem above that the total amount of tra c at equilibrium, given by (8) , is not a function of the number of users. In particular, this is also the socially optimal solution, i.e., it is the routing policy obtained when there is only one user whose total requirement for transmission rate equals (this can be seen from our analysis by setting j = 0 for all users j 6 = i). This implies that the Nash equilibrium is e cient (this means that it coincides with the solution to a global optimization problem in which the cost to be minimized is the sum of costs of all users). It is thus also a Pareto optimal solution (a Pareto optimal solution is a multi-strategy for which there does not exist a dominating one, i.e. we cannot nd another multi-strategy that performs at least as good for all players, and strictly better for at least one player. This is a natural concept in the context of cooperation between users). Thus, even if there were cooperation, the users would still use the same equilibrium policy.
THE TWO-LINK CASE: CONVERGENCE TO EQUILIBRIUM
The equilibrium has the property that once it is reached, the users will continue to use the same policy, and the system will remain in that equilibrium. A crucial question is the dynamics of reaching that equilibrium. Toward addressing this question, we shall make the behavioral assumption that users occasionally update their policies in a greedy way, i.e., they use their best response to the current policy of other users. We study the convergence of such schemes for the two-link case, that is with M = 2.
For each xed policy of user j, the best response of user i, i 6 = j, is computed In terms of this notation, we obtain from (6) and Theorem 3.1:
where rA is an N N matrix whose entries are given by
Remark. The optimal response requires from each user to know only the sum of the ows on each link, and not their individual values which makes implementation easier. Indeed, it su ces for a user to know the cost that he accrues on each link and his own ows, to be able to compute the sum of ows of other users on each link.
Remark. In the algorithms that follow, we do not take into account the ow positivity constraints in the computation of the optimal responses. Thus, if we start far enough from the equilibrium point, then the computed ows could become negative. The following stability results should therefore be interpreted only locally, and the analysis becomes valid once the ows stir away from the boundaries at zero.
Round-Robin response
We rst consider a round-robin adjustment scheme where the users update their policies (by using the optimal response (6) or (10)) sequentially, in the order 1; 2; : : : ; N, 1; 2; : : :; N, etc.
Denote by i (n) the value of i at the nth iteration for Player i. We note that it is a function of all j 's for j 6 = i, where for j < i these have already been updated n times, and for j > i these have only been updated n ? 1 times.
More precisely, we can express the updates in the form: 
This provides an implicit recursive updating formula for the deviation of the policies from their equilibrium values at the end of the n + 1st update cycle. Solving for (n + 1) from (12), we have (n + 1) = ?C ?1 A (n) ; (13) provided that C is invertible, where C := (2I + B), and I denotes the identity matrix. We now show that this scheme is convergent. We conclude that all zeros of M(z) are in the interior of the unit disk, which implies that the Round Robin update scheme converges to the unique Nash equilibrium.
Pairwise simultaneous adjustment
We consider in this subsection a Round Robin scheme in which the users update their policies in pairs, i.e., rst players 1 and 2 update, then players 3 and 4 update, and so on. For this scheme to make sense, we take the number of players to be even. We call this scheme Round Robin in blocks of two, which also converges as shown below.
Theorem 4.2. The Round Robin in blocks of two converges to the unique Nash equilibrium given in Theorem 3.1.
Proof: With the notation of the previous subsection, we obtain the implicit update rule as (n + 1) = ? 1 2 A (n) ? 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 :
The explicit update formula is again (13) 
This step is obtained by induction. Indeed, it holds for n = 1, for which we obtain P 1 (z) = (2z ? 1)(2z + 1). Assume that it holds for some n.
Note that the characteristic polynomial for the matrix without the rst column and the last row is (1 ? x) 2n . P n+1 (z) can be written as P n+1 = (x ? 1) Minor This establishes by induction the form (17) of the characteristic polynomial P n (z) for z 6 = 1. Now, we prove that the roots of the polynomial P n (x) are in the interior of the unit circle:
If jzj > 1, then jxj > 2, so that jx?1j > 1 and jx?1j n > 1. Hence j1?z(x?1) n j > 0, which implies that P n (z) 6 = 0. This implies that z is not a zero of P n (z).
We thus conclude that all zeros of the characteristic polynomial P n (x) are in the interior of the unit disk, and hence the update scheme converges to the unique Nash equilibrium.
4.3. Random greedy algorithms Consider now the following Random Polling algorithm. There is a xed integer K < N, such that at each update time n, K players are chosen at random to update. We shall rst show that this algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium when K = 1. Later we shall show that for K > 3 the random polling is unstable. Proof: We shall show that lim n!1 (n) = 0 with probability one. Let A(i) denote the matrix that corresponds to the update of player i, i.e., the matrix given by A(i) (j;j) = 1 and A(i) i;j = ?1=2 for all j 6 = i, and all other elements are 0. This again implies (19) , which establishes (18).
Since (n) are i.i.d., and for every j, the probability that (n) = j is strictly positive, it follows that the round-robin sequence (1; 2; :::; N) appears in the sequence (n) in nitely often with probability 1. Moreover, for any integer V , the sequence (1; 2; :::; N) V appears in nitely often with probability 1. Let B = Q N j=1 A(j). We have established in Theorem 4.1 that B n ! 0. This implies, in particular, that the L 1 norm of B n converges to 0. It is then easy to show that for any > 0 there exists some integer V such that Z(B V x) Z(x); for any x 2 IR N . This, together with (18) , implies that with probability 1, lim n!1 Z( (n)) = 0, and hence lim n!1 (n) = 0.
Remark. We see from the above proof that convergence to the Nash equilibrium actually holds under more general probabilistic assumptions. In fact, the convergence is obtained along each sample path for which the sequence B V appears in nitely often.
Next, we show that if we relax the condition K = 1 in the random polling algorithm, then this could give rise to instability. To see this, consider a sequence of i.i.d. random vectors fX n g, n = 1; 2; :::, where X n = (X 
If the term in the square brackets is smaller than or equal to -1, then L(n) does not converge. This condition is equivalent to p 4=(N +1). This implies, in particular, that the parallel update algorithm, in which all users update simultaneously (p = 1), does not converge if N > 3. Moreover, the random polling algorithm does not converge if K > 3. This phenomenon may be related to the well known fact that di erent conditions for convergence may apply to the Gauss-Seidel and Jacobi iterative schemes; see e.g., 2, 3]. In order to avoid the above instability in the case of parallel update, some restrictions have to be imposed. This motivates us to introduce in the next section a forgetting factor that smooths the variations due to best responses of players.
Parallel update with a forgetting factor (relaxation parameter)
We have seen above that if N > 3 and all players update simultaneously at each step (K = N), then there is no convergence to the Nash equilibrium. The instability seems to be due to the fact that when all players change their strategies in the same manner, then this leads to growing oscillations. We consider in this subsection a possible dampening of these oscillations by allowing only a partial update; we consider a natural scenario where a player does not completely change his strategy from one step to the next, but rather uses a new strategy obtained as a convex combination of the calculated optimal response and the previously used action. In other words, the deviation vector n+1 at the n + 1th step is given by n+1 = ( rA + (1 ? )I) n ; where rA is as de ned by (11), I is the identity matrix, and > 0 is called the forgetting factor. 
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied in this paper the problem of static competitive routing, rst for M parallel links and subsequently in more detail for the case of two parallel links, and with linear link holding costs. In the two-link case, we have focused on the stability of the equilibrium, i.e., on the question of whether equilibrium is actually reached if players start initially at some other arbitrary point. Our analysis suggests that under some scenarios where users update their actions independently and in a completely greedy way, the unique equilibrium may be unstable. In particular, if all users update simultaneously, oscillations could occur and the routing decisions diverge if the number of players is larger than 3. On the other hand if memory is added and updated actions use a convex combination of previous actions and the new greedy best response, then stability can be achieved.
Our approach is related to the so called "Cournot Adjustment" scheme 9] in economics. The round-robin scheme is known as the alternating-move Cournot dynamic; it is closely related to the Gauss-Seidel iteration for the solution of linear equations; see, e.g., 2, 3] . An alternative way of adding memory to the best response would be to compute best responses to the time averaged actions of other players, and not just to their latest strategy. This approach, known as " ctitious play 9] will be the subject of future study.
We plan to study in the future the stability of equilibria in more complex topologies, in particular for those where it is known that there exists a unique equilibrium.
Furthermore, we intend to consider other cost functions, such as those whose linearized versions contain bias terms, and those that are player-dependent.
